By – R.Lakher
Introduction
Chin State, a remote region in Myanmar, has become a focal point of escalating tensions between two major political and armed factions. On one side is the Chinland Council, led by the Chin National Front (CNF), and on the other is the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) with its armed wing, the Chin Brotherhood (CB). Since the Chin Brotherhood’s formation on December 30, 2023, the conflict between these groups has intensified, posing severe risks to the region’s stability and the well-being of its people.
The Genesis of the Conflict
The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the formation of the Chinland Council (CC) under the leadership of Chin National Fronts (CC) on December 6, 2023. The Chin Brotherhood was established in direct opposition to the Chinland Council under the CNF’s leadership, rejecting its legitimacy and authority, citing no inclusiveness, equality, or too much role of Chin National Fronts (CNF) in the Chinland Council.
As a result, the Chin Brotherhood (CB) was formed on December 30, 2023, by three armed groups: Chin National Organization (CNO), Zoland-PDF, and CDF-Mindat, later joined by three more groups: Maraland Defense Force (MDF), CDF-Kanpalet, and CDF-Matupi (Brigade-1). This rift has led to many armed clashes, deepening the divide between the two factions. The common armed clashes were in the Maraland Chin National Army (CNA), the Chinland Council armed alliances with MDF in January-February 2024, and the Chin Brotherhood (CB) during the Matupi Operation against the military junta in the southern part of Chin state. The fight was no longer between the military junta (Tatmadaw) and the Chin revolutionary armed groups, but also the fight among the Chin groups themselves. The political landscape in Chin State is now fraught with tension, with both groups vying for control and influence.
Failed Mediation Attempts
Over the past months, numerous third parties have attempted to mediate between the Chinland Council and the ICNCC/Chin Brotherhood. These efforts have involved a diverse range of actors, including Chin religious organizations, the National Unity Government (NUG), civil society organizations, and political groups from Mizoram, such as the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP), ZORO, and others, Young Mizo Association (YMA), Mizoram Zarlai Pawl (ZPM). International non-governmental organizations (INGOs), such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), have also sought to intervene.
However, these mediation efforts have largely failed to produce a sustainable resolution. The reasons for this are manifold:
- Lack of Inclusiveness: Many mediating parties have not been fully inclusive, failing to represent all stakeholders involved in the conflict. This has led to a lack of trust and buy-in from both factions, undermining the effectiveness of mediation efforts.
- Lack of Commitment: Both the mediators and the conflicting parties have demonstrated a lack of commitment to the mediation process. Without genuine dedication to achieving peace, any attempts at resolution are likely to falter.
- Resource Constraints: While well-intentioned, Chin religious organizations and the NUG lack the necessary resources, and inclusiveness to carry out effective mediation. Their limited capacity has hindered their ability to exert meaningful influence over the conflicting parties.
The Need for a Unified Approach
A more coordinated and unified approach is essential for mediation to be successful. Mizo civil society organizations, in particular, need to come together to form a cohesive mediation body. Different CSOs in Mizoram, such as Mizoram Zirlai Pawl (MZP), Central Young Mizoram Association (CYMA), Zo Re-Unification Organization (ZORO), etc have started their initiatives of mediation between the two chin-armed groups with their respective approaches and policies. Acting individually, these organizations are unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes; their efforts seems ineffective. However, if they unite, they can pool their resources, exert more significant pressure on both factions and present a stronger case for peace among Chin armed groups.
In addition to local efforts, the involvement of INGOs like CMI remains crucial. With their extensive resources, experience, and professional methodologies, organizations like CMI are well-equipped to facilitate negotiations. However, their success depends on the willingness of the Chinland Council and the ICNCC/Chin Brotherhood to accept their mediation and commit to the process.
Conclusion
The conflict in Chin State is at a critical juncture. Without effective mediation, the violence and instability are likely to continue, further endangering the lives of those caught in the crossfire. The time has come for Mizo civil society organizations to unite and for all involved parties to commit to a genuine peace process. With the right approach, there is still hope for a peaceful resolution, but it requires collective effort, commitment, and the involvement of experienced mediators like CMI. Only then can the people of Chin State look forward to a future free from conflict.
Note: The columnist is a young Chin political analyst, and this article is only the author’s mouthpiece. It is not the mouthpiece of Khonumthung Media Group.
R.Lakher (Chin Revolution and Political Observer, and Policy analyst, +918731065896, peterjune20@gmail.com)